

Urban Faith: Religious Change in Vienna and Austria, 1986–2013

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1. Introduction

Religiosity tends to play a different role in the lives of city dwellers and rural populations respectively. Research has consistently established that larger cities are more secular and religiously diverse than smaller towns and the countryside. In part, compositional factors are responsible for this gap: cities are prone to be inhabited by well educated and affluent people who are likely to be less religious (Ruiter and van Tubergen 2009). Religious diversity is high as metropolises attract foreign migrants who adhere to different religions. There are also factors that are specific to urban spaces. Modernisation and rationalisation have taken a more solid foothold in cities where social ties are frequently less dense and less likely to be based on family or neighbours, resulting in less social control.

Against this backdrop, we studied trends in religiosity in Vienna from 1986 to 2013 and compared them to developments in the other eight federal states of Austria. Following Berlin, Vienna is the second largest city in the German-speaking countries and by far the largest urban hub in Austria. Comprising 1.77 million inhabitants (21% of Austria's population), the gap between the capital and the next largest cities is considerable: Graz has 270,000 inhabitants and Linz has 194,000 (data from 1 January 2014; Bundesanstalt Statistik Austria 2014). Hence we contrasted a metropolis comprised of a large, highly dense population with the rest of the country, i.e. cities and towns of much smaller scale as well as rural regions.

Vienna's religious structure has changed at an astonishingly fast pace. Within the past 30 years, the Roman Catholic population has halved from 78% in 1981 to 41% in 2011,¹ while the percentage of unaffiliated has tri-

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pled from 10% to 30% (Bundesanstalt Statistik Austria 2011; Goujon 2015). The secular population has grown primarily as a result of the large numbers of people who have defected from the Catholic Church. Contemporaneous with rapid secularisation, increased immigration contributed significantly to the growing variety of Vienna's religious landscape. The fall of the Iron Curtain, the wars in the former Yugoslavia, migrant workers' family members arriving from Turkey, and an opening of the labour market to workers from the countries in Central and Eastern Europe are all factors which have brought immigrants of various faiths into the increasingly multinational capital of Austria. Over the three decades from 1981 to 2011, the percentage of Muslims rose from 0.4% to 12% and the Christian Orthodox community increased from 1% to 8%. The Protestant Church has been losing members, falling from 7% to 4% of the population. Jews made up 0.4% of the Viennese population in 1981 and have remained rather stable in their numbers (0.5% in 2011). In addition, members of previously (nearly) unrepresented religions are now more clearly visible, including Buddhists, Hindus, Mormons, and Sikhs. Migration has also changed the faces of long-established religions. For example, the share of German and Polish Roman Catholics living in Vienna has grown over time. An ongoing scientific project on the 'Cartography of Religions in Vienna,' based at the University of Vienna, has mapped over 800 places that are used by religious communities (e.g., information centres or places of worship), thereby illustrating the wealth of religious traditions in Vienna.²

In this paper, we have gone beyond religious affiliation (while providing some key figures) and have examined trends and patterns of religious belief and practice in Vienna and the other federal states. Our approach is descriptive rather than explanatory. We principally compare the two largest groups, namely Roman Catholics and unaffiliated people. Our empirical analysis is explicitly tied to theoretical concepts and covers the following topics:

- (a) We depict trends in religious affiliation and in the two main forms of religious practice: church attendance and praying. Trends over time, and changes with age and across cohorts are examined.
- (b) We study cohort trends in the general measure of self-assessed religiosity among Roman Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, and unaffiliated people.

¹ Data pertaining to 1981 are taken from the census, data for 2011 are estimates based on religious projections. For a visualisation of these projections, see <http://www.wirel-project.at/dataviz>.

² For further information, see <http://kartrel.univie.ac.at> and the paper by Simon Steinbeiss (2014) in this volume.

- (c) We identify four different types of people based on their religious practice and beliefs: the traditional religious, religious, ‘fuzzy,’ and non-religious. In addition, we investigate beliefs outside the church (‘believing without belonging’).

Our analyses are based on 24 individual surveys. Trends in religious affiliation and church attendance can be investigated for the years 1981/1986–2010, while information on other aspects of religiosity is limited to a few specialised surveys that capture the situation in the early 1990s, in 1999, 2008 and 2012/2013. The data sources are the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), the European Values Study (EVS), the census, and the Quality of Life in Vienna survey.

This paper adds to the Austrian literature on religion, which has not explicitly addressed the contrast between Vienna and the other federal states. Compared to other European countries, Austria’s population is above-average in its level of religiosity, not only in terms of church membership, but also with regard to church attendance and belief in God (Pickel 2010). However, Austria is also among the countries with a trend of declining religiosity (Voas 2009; Polak and Schachinger 2011). Vienna constitutes a ‘special case’ (Friesl and Zuba 2001: 121) within Austria. The rejection of Christian beliefs and distancing from the church—to name just two examples—is highest in the capital (Zulehner and Polak 2009). Rural religion also differs from urban forms: rural customs, often tied to peasant life, are characteristic of the countryside (Mörth 1986). Our contribution, moreover, complements prior international research on religion in the city which has mostly relied on qualitative case studies, often from the perspective of anthropology or religious studies (e.g., Orsi 1999; Pinxten and Dikomitis 2009). We provide a quantitative account of religion in one of Europe’s most thriving metropolises.

The paper starts with a discussion of theoretical concepts, which is followed by a presentation of the data sources. The subsequent sections are dedicated to the empirical findings. We present findings in terms of religious affiliation, church attendance, age and cohort trends in disaffiliation and church attendance, praying, self-assessed religiosity, and types of religiosity. In the final section we provide a concise summary of the main results.

2. Theoretical Concepts: Religious Change in Urban Contexts

The plethora of research on secularisation and religious change allows for some theoretical insights into the reasons why cities tend to be more secular than rural places. Classic secularisation theory posits that unfolding modernity will likely lead to the erosion of religion (Pollack 2012). Cities have been the vanguards of modernity and today their populations are more highly educated, wealthier, and more prone to work in the tertiary sector (rather than in agriculture) compared to rural regions. For example, twice as many people hold a university degree in Vienna than in the other federal states (20% versus 10%; Bundesanstalt Statistik Austria 2013). Higher education has been linked to increased rationalisation and a technical conscience through which people adopt the logic of science and tend to look for natural causes and regularities instead of drawing on transcendent explanations. In this way, inner-worldly matters have replaced an outer-worldly orientation (Bruce 1999).

In the process of development, society—the modern state, cities, large enterprises—rather than the immediate community has become people's focus (Bruce 1999). This is nowhere more apparent than in cities, where social networks tend to be larger and social ties less intense and more based on friendship than on kinship and neighbourhood solidarities (Beggs, Haines and Hurlbert 1996)—to the detriment of religion, which is more strongly retained in close communities. Confessional milieus were once important pillars of religious stability and complemented religious socialisation in families. These milieus consisted of people with the same religious denomination, who shared values and norms while gathering in church-based associations (Wolf 1995). In Austria, the Catholic milieu (as opposed to the social democratic milieu) has weakened over the last decades. Today, 'globalised' individuals concentrate in cities and are rarely oriented towards the local (parish) community. Some migrant groups are exceptions as they arrive via pre-established networks and are immediately integrated into religious (support) networks. More generally, the wealth of leisure opportunities in contemporary cities rival Sunday services and church-based associations.

Cities are inhabited by culturally and religiously diverse populations. Religious pluralism challenges the claims of (some) religious institutions to uniqueness and truth. As Bruce stated pointedly, 'When the oracle speaks with a single clear voice, it is easy to believe it is the voice of God. When it speaks with twenty different voices, it is tempting to look behind the screen' (Bruce 1999: 21). People holding different religious views interact, form

friendships, and become couples. This situation leads to an increasing acceptance of other religions, which calls into question more exclusive ideologies. Religious reality can no longer be taken for granted and uncertainties arise (Berger 1990 [1967]). Religious diversity in cities may also foster greater inter-religious dialogue. In Vienna, the percentage of ‘other’ (non-Catholic) religions is twice as high as in the rest of the country (Goujon et al. 2007; Goujon 2015).

Cities not only stand out due to their higher levels of rationalisation, diversity and looser social ties. Their inhabitants also tend to hold more liberal and egalitarian views—views that contradict the conservative values and hierarchical structure associated with most churches. City dwellers are more likely than their rural peers to behave in a manner that is inconsistent with traditional teachings (such as unmarried cohabitation or divorce) which may, in turn, increase distance from institutionalised religion.

However, there are trends that counteract urban secularisation. Individualised forms of religiosity may be more easily adopted in cities, new forms of religiosity may emerge, and migrants from more religious countries may settle in cities. Secularisation is by no means the hegemonic interpretation of religious change. Although institutionalised religiosity has lost ground, religiosity itself has not disappeared, but has changed its form to become more privatised and individualised (Luckmann 1967; Hervieu-Léger 2004). People less frequently embrace predetermined belief systems and rather construct their own religious patchwork. Such individualised religiosity is commonly a syncretism of beliefs from different religious traditions, marked by irregular practices and a lack of integration into a community of likeminded individuals. This type of religiosity may be more prevalent in cities, where populations have been described as more individualistic and in which the range of services of ‘alternative’ religions is more elaborate (Höllinger 2005). Cities may also stimulate new forms of religiosity or expression, as has been illustrated by a series of case studies (Pinxten and Dikomitis 2009). Cities attract international migrants from highly religious countries, who retain their religiosity in ethnic communities and change the religious make-up of the host population (Berghammer and Fliegenschnee 2014). The more developed infrastructure in cities may better cater to the needs of adherents, in particular of minority religions. In this contribution, we investigate trends in both institutionalised religiosity (affiliation and church attendance) and private religiosity (praying), thereby comparing religious diversity in Vienna and the rest of Austria.

Religious change either takes place along cohort lines or over the life course. When change unfolds over cohorts, each younger cohort enters adulthood at a less religious level than their predecessors because of their

weaker religious socialisation. The level of their religiosity remains largely stable throughout their life-times. If age-related changes chiefly drive religious change, the probability of becoming less religious is not significantly higher for young people, but rather remains high over the whole life course. Empirical evidence seems to be more indicative of cohort change (e.g., Voas and Crockett 2005; Wolf 2008; but see: Lois 2011), but different aspects of religiosity may show divergent patterns. What has been demonstrated, e.g., for the Netherlands (Te Grotenhuis and Scheepers 2001), may also apply to Austria: church attendance declines to a low level early in life, whereas religious disaffiliation may happen at all ages. In fact, it has been shown that ‘mid-life disaffiliation’ is a common pattern of behaviour in Austria (McClendon and Hackett 2014). In this paper, we also shed light on age and cohort changes in affiliation and attendance.

Several studies have taken a closer look at how secularisation unfolds. David Voas has alluded to the fact that decidedly religious and non-religious people make up less than half of the populations in most European countries (2009). The majority holds what this author termed a ‘fuzzy’ kind of religiosity, defined in the following way:

Many people remain interested in church weddings and funerals, Christmas services, and local festivals. They believe in “something out there”, pay at least lip service to Christian values, and may be willing to identify with a denomination. They are neither regular churchgoers (now only a small minority of the population in most European countries) nor self-consciously non-religious. Because they retain some loyalty to tradition, though in a rather uncommitted way, we can call the phenomenon fuzzy fidelity. (Voas 2009: 161)

Voas argued that religious individuals would rarely become non-religious all of a sudden, but rather more indifferent to religion and fuzzier in their beliefs and practices (also over cohorts). At the onset of secularisation in a country, the proportion of the ‘fuzzy-fidelity’ population would start to rise and, with advancing secularisation, would decline again as people increasingly shift into the non-religious category.

In this paper, we estimate the size of the fuzzy group in Vienna versus the other federal states and illustrate changes over time. By introducing a large set of measures of religiosity, we have become able to recognise the profile of members within the fuzzy group.

Ingrid Storm identified four subgroups of the fuzzy religious across ten European countries (Austria was not included), among them the group of those ‘believing without belonging’ (2009). This term—introduced by Grace Davie (1990)—has become a catchphrase for individuals who hold

religious beliefs and perform religious practices without adhering to any church. This implies that different aspects of religiosity may develop in different ways. According to Storm's findings, those believing without belonging tend to pray frequently, believe in God, call themselves religious and affirm they have a spiritual life, yet are distant from the church and consider religious services at birth, marriage, and death unimportant. On average, the reach of this group is approximately 10% of the populations in the countries under study.

In the concluding part of our empirical analysis, we focus on the growing group of unaffiliated people in Austria in order to study the concept of believing without belonging.

3. Data Sources

We based our empirical analysis on four data sources comprising 24 individual surveys. We used 17 waves of the *International Social Survey Programme* (ISSP). In Austria, the ISSP was conducted between 1986 and 2010 among adults of age 16 years and over. In some years, two waves were administered together and we therefore dispose of 13 data points (Table 1). Religious affiliation and church attendance are the only two measures to have been included in all ISSP waves, enabling us to show changes over a period of 25 years. Moreover, three special modules conducted in 1993, 1999, and 2008 contain additional questions, such as the frequency of praying or religious beliefs. We compared trends in affiliation based on the ISSP with numbers from the *census* in 1981, 1991, and 2001. As the census included the whole Austrian population, it can be considered the most reliable source on religious affiliation in Austria. However, the 2001 census was the last to contain this characteristic. Due to its large number of respondents, the census is the only dataset to allow detailed spatial analyses. We thus applied it to devise geographical maps on affiliation in Vienna.

We used three waves of the *European Values Study* (EVS), conducted among adults aged 18 years and older. The EVS is by far the richest source of information on various aspects of religiosity. Although some questions are differently phrased in the EVS and ISSP, correspondence is generally satisfactory. After meticulous data checks between the two programmes—which were facilitated by the fact that two EVS surveys were conducted in the same year as ISSP surveys on religion—we employed the EVS to more closely examine religious types. In particular, we used the EVS 2008 to shed more light on the nature of fuzzy religiosity.

Our fourth data source was the *Quality of Life in Vienna survey (Lebensqualität in Wien im 21. Jahrhundert)*. Commissioned by the City of Vienna, this survey was carried out in 2012/2013 among 8,400 persons living in Vienna. While its focus was on different aspects of life quality, it also asked for religious affiliation and self-assessed religiosity among a subset of 4,244 respondents aged 15 and older. This large sample size allowed us to sketch changes in religiosity over cohorts among Roman Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, and the unaffiliated. All the surveys used were designed to provide a representative picture of the Austrian and Viennese population. All analyses are weighted.

Table 1: Overview of survey years from the ISSP and EVS in Austria, 1986–2010

	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
ISSP	Grey		Grey	Grey				Black	Grey	Grey				Black	Grey	Grey	Grey		Grey				Black		Grey
EVS					Black									Black									Black		

Note: Grey shading indicates that information on religious affiliation and church attendance is available, black shading indicates that a larger number of questions on religion were asked.

The majority of analyses compared the two main groups in Vienna and Austria: Roman Catholics and unaffiliated persons. Neither the sample sizes of the ISSP nor the EVS facilitated an investigation of members belonging to other religions or denominations—especially since we compared Vienna to the other federal states. Case number limitations restricted us to certain analyses for the whole of Austria only. Sample sizes in the ISSP varied from slightly less than 1,000 to about 2,000 respondents, but for most years were limited to about 1,000 respondents. EVS samples were slightly more robust and comprised approximately 1,500 respondents. The number of respondents residing in Vienna was commonly approximately 200 in the ISSP and 300 in the EVS. A detailed table on sample sizes in individual years is provided in the Appendix (Table A.1).

We employed descriptive statistical methods and followed a comparative approach, thereby contrasting Vienna with the other federal states and identifying temporal trends and patterns. We also included a demographic perspective by examining trends by age and broad birth cohorts. Besides displaying results based on one-item measures, we also synthesised different dimensions of religiosity and created a classification that distinguishes different degrees of religiosity: (traditional) religious, fuzzy religious, and non-religious. Its construction is explained in detail in section 4.6. The

Appendix contains information on the wording of the questions and recoding of the original categories (Table A.2).

4. Empirical Results

4.1. Religious Affiliation

By the 1950s, Vienna's religious structure was already different from that of the rest of Austria. The share of unaffiliated people was three times higher in Vienna and the share of Roman Catholics was ten percentage points lower.³ By 2001, Roman Catholics constituted less than half of the population (49%) in Vienna according to census estimates (Figure 1). Such a low value is likely only to be reached in the distant future in the whole of Austria: religious projections assume that less than half of the population will be Roman Catholic from around the year 2045 (Goujon et al. 2007). Indicating an affiliation to the Roman Catholic or Protestant church is less subjective in Austria than in other countries on account of its strong institutional underpinning. An individual becomes a member through baptism and is obliged to pay church taxes (from entry into the labour market) in order to retain membership. Membership can be resigned from the age of 14 before a public authority. This framework implies that the definition of (not) belonging is rather clear-cut and generally shared.

Figure 1 shows a linear decline in the percentage of Roman Catholics in both Vienna and the other federal states, with a much steeper slope in the capital. Because of sampling bias, estimates pertaining to the ISSP yield higher values than the census data. The ISSP does not accurately capture respondents belonging to minority religions, thus resulting in inflated values for Roman Catholics. The share of Roman Catholics was thus most probably lower in 2010 than indicated by the ISSP values, namely around 40-45% (Goujon 2015), which is approximately half of the share in the other federal states.

The more rapidly declining figures for Roman Catholics in the capital may primarily be attributed to constantly higher rates of disaffiliation. During the 1990s, an annual average of 1.21% of Roman Catholics left in the diocese of Vienna (which exceeds the city borders and includes surrounding

³ The census in 1951 documented 81.6% Roman Catholics in Vienna versus 91.2% in the other federal states and 8.1% unaffiliated in Vienna versus 2.5% in the other federal states.

regions) compared to 0.60% in the rest of Austria. During the 2000s, the respective values were 1.05% and 0.72%. The rates of disaffiliation converged as they (slightly) slowed down in Vienna over the most recent decade while accelerating in the other parts of the country. In general, the rate of leaving has been independent of whether the leadership of the Austrian church was rather open or detached from the world (Zulehner 2011: 32). Church scandals—for instance, a sex scandal in a seminary in 2004 and child abuse scandals in 1995 and 2010—triggered waves of leaving around certain years. The highest figure of disaffiliation since the middle of the last century was recorded as recently as 2010. By all accounts, a further decline of the Catholic population seems inevitable. The latest data suggest an ongoing downward trend (Figure 1), and one third of Catholics in Austria indicated that they had thought about leaving the church (Zulehner 2011: 33).


The rise in the proportion of unaffiliated individuals mirrors the decline of the Roman Catholic share. This implies that switching to another religion or denomination is uncommon. While the absolute gap between Vienna and the rest of Austria has grown over the past decades, the relative gap remains rather stable: the percentage of unaffiliated is three times higher in Vienna than in the rest of the country (based on the census in 1981, 1991 and 2001). The latest numbers show that around 30% are unaffiliated in Vienna versus 10% in the other federal states. Among this group, the unaffiliated of the second generation—those who were raised by at least one unaffiliated parent—has increased over time (Table 2). Distance to institutionalised religion is presumably greater in this group than among the unaffiliated of the first generation who have some religious roots.

The capital is not only more secular but also more religiously diverse than the rest of Austria. According to the latest estimates, close to 30% of the Viennese population is made up of Muslims, Protestants, Orthodox Christians, Jews, or members of other religions (Goujon 2015)⁴—specific numbers are provided in the introduction. This share is approximately twice as high as in the rest of Austria.


4 The latest Viennese data for religious affiliation by country of birth are available for 2001 (City of Vienna 2001): 89% of the Roman Catholics were born in Austria; 79% of the Protestants were born in Austria and 8% in Germany; 30% of the Muslims were born in Austria (predominantly second-generation migrants), 18% in former Yugoslavia (Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia or Macedonia) and 36% in Turkey; 25% of the Orthodox Christians were born in Austria and 52% in Serbia and Montenegro; 42% of the Jewish population was born in Austria and 81% of unaffiliated people were born in Austria.

Figure 1: Religious affiliation in Vienna and the other federal states, 1981–2010

(A) Vienna



(B) Other federal states



Note: Full symbols refer to ISSP estimates and empty symbols refer to census data. Data sources: ISSP 1986–2010; Austrian census 1981, 1991 and 2001.

Table 2: Unaffiliated persons by parents' affiliation, Vienna and Austria, 1993 and 2008 (in percent)

	Vienna		Other federal states		Austria	
	1993	2008	1993	2008	1993	2008
Both parents affiliated	70	60	83	78	75	71
One parent affiliated*	14	8	7	15	11	12
No parent affiliated**	16	32	9	7	13	17
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Note: Not all respondents were raised by both parents and not all of them reported religious affiliation of both parents, thus: * the other parent either unaffiliated or of unknown affiliation; ** either both parents unaffiliated or one unaffiliated and other unknown. Information on fathers' affiliation was missing more often than mothers'. Respondents who failed to specify the religious affiliation of both parents were disregarded. Data source: ISSP 1993 and 2008.

Adherents of different religions and denominations are not uniformly distributed in Vienna. The maps show the regional patterns of Roman Catholics and unaffiliated people within the capital in 2001⁵ (Figure 2). Roman Catholics are mostly concentrated in the less densely populated outer districts and in the inner city district (first district) and some immediately bordering districts. The other inner districts are more religiously diverse (Sprieger and Bauer 2014). This pattern may partly be explained by cheaper housing in the areas around the so-called Gürtel, a city ring road with a high concentration of Muslim residents. Among all districts, the share of both Muslims and Orthodox Christians is highest in the 15th district just to the west of the Gürtel (Bundesanstalt Statistik Austria 2003). The Jewish population, on the other hand, is mostly concentrated in the first district and the district bordering to the east (second district). Non-affiliated predominantly live in the eastern parts of Vienna (to the east of the Danube) and some areas in the southern districts.

⁵ The latest data on religious affiliation of such detail are available for the year 2001. A spatial analysis of citizenship and country of birth in Vienna compared the years 2001 and 2011 and found relatively stable patterns (albeit a change in level) and a strong association between these indicators and religious affiliation in 2001 (Sprieger and Bauer 2014). The authors thus suggested that neighbourhood profiles for religion may also hold.

Figure 2: Spatial distribution of Roman Catholics and unaffiliated people in Vienna, 2001

(A) Roman Catholics



(B) Unaffiliated



Data source: Austrian census 2001.

Credits: Openstreetmap contributors; stamen.com; Cartography: Ramon Bauer.

In conclusion, secularisation and diversification processes have operated much more rapidly in Vienna compared to the rest of Austria. Nonetheless, the trends are similar: first, the Roman Catholic church has been losing ground in favour of the unaffiliated and, second, non-Christian religions are on the increase. We are unable to make substantial statements about actual religious commitment by simply looking at religious belonging. The subsequent sections therefore explore the members' religiosity, starting with church attendance.

4.2. Church Attendance among Roman Catholics


Church attendance is a particularly useful measure for Roman Catholics as they are obliged (in the eyes of the church) to attend church services on Sundays and religious holidays. But whoever visits a Sunday service in a Viennese parish will recognise immediately that only a minority adheres to this rule. Indeed, a mere 5% of Catholics in Vienna attend church every week compared with 15% in the other federal states (based on ISSP 2010). This is a significant decline from 15% in Vienna and 30% in the rest of Austria 25 years ago (in 1986). This process has been a bad blow for the parishes as they are losing the core of their members who additionally often engage in community life beyond attending services on Sundays. The decline is due to older cohorts (who attend more frequently) being replaced by younger ones and to fading church attendance over the life course. (Both processes are analysed in detail in the following section.) Instead of being a regular activity, church services have for many become a festive frame for their Christmas and Easter celebrations as well as family events (baptism, first communion, confirmation, weddings and funerals). This pattern is captured in a high prevalence of participating in church services several times a year (or less) (Figure 3).

Church attendance in Vienna and the rest of Austria remains a world apart. Not only are there fewer Roman Catholics in Vienna, but they also attend church less frequently. This implies that despite higher rates of disaffiliation, a selection towards higher religiosity is not (yet) perceptible. Over recent years, less than 20% of Roman Catholics in Vienna have attended church once a month or more often compared to approximately 30% in the other federal states. The (absolute) decline has been steeper outside the capital, albeit from a higher starting level. On the other end of the scale are those who (almost) never attend services. This growing group now comprises 70% of Roman Catholics in Vienna and around 40% in the rest of Austria. The capital had recorded such a level more than 25 years ago: since


the mid-1980s half of the Roman Catholic population rarely or never attend church services.

Figure 3: Church attendance among Roman Catholics in Vienna and the other federal states, 1986–2010

(A) Vienna



(B) Other federal states



Data source: ISSP 1986–2010.

4.3. Age and Cohort Trends in Disaffiliation and Church Attendance


Two mechanisms may drive the decline in religiosity observed so far: cohort change or changes over the life course. Either each new generation is socialised to become less religious than their predecessors, or disaffiliation and a reduction in church attendance may take place with advancing age.

Our results indicate that different processes operate for religious belonging and practice (Figure 4). Affiliation with the Catholic Church remains high across cohorts—even in the two youngest cohorts, 80-90% indicated that they had been affiliated in early adulthood. A high acceptance of baptism is behind these high numbers. The decision to leave the church is taken later in life and more often among the younger cohorts born since the 1960s. Many Catholics have a sense of belonging (often rooted in childhood) and do not find it easy to leave. This decision is often the last step within a rather long process during which religious practice and beliefs have declined and negative experiences (e.g., with church representatives) have accumulated. Social expectations articulated by parents or grandparents may also play a role. Once the decision to leave is taken, it is seldom reversed in a subsequent re-entry.

The picture is very much different for church attendance. Each younger cohort attends church less than their predecessors, resulting in a widening gap between the two measures and a rise in nominal Catholics (i.e. non-regular churchgoers) among the younger generations. This implies that the decline in attendance is primarily cohort-driven. Age-related patterns are, on the contrary, rather diverse across cohorts. Some individuals in the oldest cohort resume frequent church attendance with advancing age and similar signs are observed for the next cohort (1940–1959), starting around the age of retirement. Among the two youngest cohorts, in turn, we noticed a clear decline with age to a very low level: in their 20s and 30s, fewer and fewer young people attend church monthly or more often.

In conclusion, we established that an age effect underlies religious disaffiliation, while a cohort effect—supplemented by an age effect for people born from the 1960s—is behind the drop in church attendance. These opposing trends push up the share of nominal Catholics in the younger cohorts.

Figure 4: Cohort trends in affiliation and church attendance among Roman Catholics in Austria



Note: Mean age of each birth cohort is computed for each survey year.
 Data source: ISSP 1986–2010.

4.4. Frequency of Praying

The two most important measures of religious practice—church attendance and praying—are of a very different nature. While church attendance is a practice in public involving a community dimension and more formalised kinds of prayers, praying as a private practice is more individual and flexible. Since individuals construct a personal relation to the sacred in prayers, they may be considered a central indicator of a person’s religiosity (Huber 2003: 311–312). Using praying as a measure, we investigated whether private religiosity follows the same or a different trend than has been seen for institutionalised religiosity (affiliation and attendance).


Although the proportion of people praying regularly (weekly or monthly) has been slightly declining, the frequency of praying has proved rather stable across 15 years. This stability is remarkable, especially when compared to the extensive changes in measures of institutionalised religiosity.

The proportion never praying is the most stable, while changes are mostly in frequent praying: the share of those who pray weekly or daily has declined both in Vienna and in the other federal states.

The Viennese pray less frequently than residents of the other federal states. In the capital, around 40% indicated that they never pray which is around double the percentage in the other parts of Austria. In Vienna, 34% prayed at least monthly compared to 51% in the rest of Austria in 2008. Additional analyses revealed that these differences result from the higher share of unaffiliated persons in Vienna (who pray seldom) and from Viennese Catholics praying less often. In 2008, about 37% of Viennese Catholics prayed at least monthly compared to 57% of Catholics in the other federal states. The share of those who never pray is higher among Catholics living in the capital (25% versus 15%).

To sum up, the patterns of praying are generally fairly stable despite a downward tendency in the proportion of regular praying. This observation is in line with the proposition that religion has become a more and more private matter. People are increasingly distant to the church and forgo institutional forms of religiosity, but some segments of the population continue to pray regularly. In this sense we may refer to a privatisation of religion, although it would seem difficult to imagine this as a model for the future: private forms have been declining, albeit at a slow pace.

Figure 5: Frequency of praying in Vienna and the other federal states, 1993–2008




Data source: ISSP 1993, 1999, and 2008.

4.5. Self-assessed Religiosity among Religious Groups in Vienna

After an examination of measures of religious practice, we turn to a measure that attempts to capture religiosity more generally: self-assessed religiosity. Respondents were asked to rate their own religiosity on a scale (here: from one for not at all religious to ten for very religious). While the measures used so far are based on observable frequencies, self-assessed religiosity is more subjective and it is difficult to fully understand the personal significance of ‘being religious’. However, the question for self-assessed religiosity does not contain any particular theological content and comparability is therefore better across members of different religions and denominations than for specific practices upon which different traditions put different emphasis.

Figure 6: Cohort trends in self-assessed religiosity among selected religious groups in Vienna, 2012/2013



Note: The mean ages of the four cohorts were 79, 64, 44, and 27 years at the time of the survey. Information regarding other cohorts and religious groups is not available due to the small numbers of respondents. Mean on a scale of 1-10. Total includes the religious groups shown plus other Christian and non-Christian religions.

Data source: Quality of Life in Vienna survey 2012/13.

Average scores for six religious groups indicate that Muslims rate their religiosity highest, at 6.5, followed by adherents of other non-Christian

faiths (Jews and other religions) with a score of 6.1. Christians assess their religiosity similarly: the average scores for Roman Catholics (4.8) and Protestants (4.7) are almost identical, while Orthodox Christians consider themselves to be more religious (5.1). Unaffiliated persons had the lowest score of 3.0 and 42% stated that they were not at all religious (value equal to 1). This perception was shared by 11% of Catholics, 15% of Protestants, 16% of Orthodox and 7% of Muslims.

Let us now turn to changes across cohorts. Overall, each younger cohort regards itself as less religious than the one before (Figure 6). Roman Catholics and Protestants have very similar levels and both churches face a steep decline among young adults aged 18-32 (i.e. cohorts born between 1980 and 1994). Unaffiliated people at ages 53 and older (i.e. cohorts born between 1920 and 1959) perceive themselves as more religious than their younger counterparts who score 2.8 on average (i.e. cohorts born from 1960). Religiosity is clearly highest among Muslims, but they too experience a slight decline among the young.


4.6. Types of Religiosity: (Traditional) Religious, Fuzzy, and Non-Religious

Scholars agree that religiosity is inherently multidimensional. To capture the complexity of religiosity, various dimensions are to be considered. In the final part of the present paper, we aim to identify types of religiosity based on a classification that contains several measures of belief and practice. This allows us to assess the size of the decidedly religious, the decidedly non-religious, and those in-between—the fuzzy type. The construction of our classification is informed by the work of David Voas (2009). We define traditional religious, religious, and non-religious as shown in Table 3. Respondents who do not fall into any of these categories are considered intermediate and labelled as *fuzzy type*. They might believe in ‘something’, yet the patterns of their religious practice are irregular and perhaps more individualised. Quite commonly, God is of medium importance in their lives and they attend church services only at major holidays; the frequency of praying is very varied in this group.

Table 3: Definition of types of religiosity

Type	Definition
Traditional religious	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - God important in their life (7-10 on a scale from 1-10) - Attend religious services at least once a month - Pray at least once a month - Believe in afterlife, heaven, hell, and sin - Consider baptism, marriage, and funeral important
Religious	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - God important in their life (7-10 on a scale from 1-10) - Attend religious services at least once a month - Pray at least once a month
Fuzzy	<i>Persons who are neither religious nor non-religious</i>
Non-religious	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - God not important in their life (1-3 on a scale from 1-10) - Attend religious services never or at most once a year - Pray never or several times a year at most

Figure 7: Distribution of (non-)religious types in Vienna and the other federal states, 1990–2008



Data source: EVS 1990, 1999, and 2008.

In Vienna, there are more non-religious than religious (including traditional religious) persons while the opposite is true in the other parts of Austria (Figure 7). The proportion of religious people is declining, while the percentage of traditional religious people remains rather stable. The suggested decline of non-religious people in Vienna should be interpreted with caution and is most likely due to the small sample size. Paying attention to the group that is inconsistently religious is crucial when describing today's religious landscape: in fact, most people in as well as outside of the capital belong to the fuzzy group. Trends over time suggest that the proportion of fuzzy people in Vienna is growing, while it remains approximately at half the population in the other federal states.

In order to better comprehend the religious profile of these four groups and the differences between them, we correlated them with other religious indicators (Table 4).

(1) The *traditional religious*, by definition, attend church regularly, most of them weekly, and pray frequently. They consider sacraments to be important and believe in traditional Catholic concepts including sin and hell which generally find little acceptance nowadays (differently from heaven and afterlife). All of them are affiliated and the large majority grew up in a very religious parental home. Traditional religious persons tend to believe in a personal God and experience situations in which God intervenes in their life. Religion is a source of comfort and strength for them. One third of this group think their faith is exclusive: they are convinced that there is only one true religion.

(2) The *religious* are affiliated, practice their faith and are likely to be integrated in a religious community, but their theological beliefs are less traditional and more inclusive than in the first group. Many of them imagine the sacred as some sort of spirit or life force and agree that other religions also contain some truth, although they themselves do not pursue practices of other traditions. They draw comfort from religion, as do their traditional religious counterparts, and think about the meaning of life as often as the first group, but experience fewer situations in which God intervenes in their lives.

(3) The *fuzzy* group is made up of affiliated (89%) but also unaffiliated (11%) persons. Religion was less important in their childhood than in the two previous groups and many describe their socialisation as rather religious or not very religious (perhaps fuzzy). However, religiosity is fuzzy in 23% even though they had a very religious upbringing (in line with the cohort change described by David Voas). The fuzzy group more obviously tends to believe in a sort of spirit or life force than a personal God and indicates that they have their own way of connecting with the divine. They

reject the idea of only one true religion and are open to other kinds of beliefs, such as belief in the power of good luck charms. Additional analyses based on the EVS 1999 revealed that the percentage of those consulting horoscopes regularly is highest in the fuzzy type. More generally, 20% of them think that it is important to explore the teachings of different religious traditions (6-10 on a 1-10 scale), much more so than among the (traditional) religious. The fuzzy group maintains a more syncretistic mixture of beliefs. Religion is much less central for them than for the two previous groups: they think less about the meaning of life and experience fewer situations in which something divine may intervene in life. Nevertheless, they take a positive stance towards religions by considering that they contain some truths.

(4) The group of the *non-religious* consists half and half of affiliated and unaffiliated persons. Many of the non-religious are agnostic or atheist; in any case, God is not important in their lives and they do not pursue any religious practice. However, with regard to the image of God, this group is the most heterogeneous of all. They generally experienced a rather or not very religious upbringing. The findings for the fuzzy group also apply here: many eventually turn out to be less religious than their parents. Religion is of no relevance in their daily lives: they never experience divine intervention and fail to draw comfort from religion. As many are decidedly non-religious (and some perhaps hostile to religion), they also refuse other kinds of beliefs, such as in the protective power of good luck charms, and reject the idea that religions may offer truth. However, part of the non-religious group have some religious sentiment and state that they have their own way of connecting with the divine as well as thinking about the meaning of life.

Table 4: Various indicators of religiosity by (non-)religious type in Austria, 2008

		Traditional religious	Religious	Fuzzy	Non-religious	Total
Religious upbringing by parents*	Very religious	69%	58%	23%	5%	29%
	Rather religious; not very religious	30%	40%	73%	68%	63%
	Not at all religious	0%	2%	4%	27%	8%
Image of God	Personal God	73%	54%	21%	2%	27%
	Spirit or life force	25%	42%	61%	32%	49%
	Don't know what to think	2%	4%	14%	22%	13%

	No spirit, God or life force	0%	0%	4%	43%	11%
Situation where God or something divine intervenes in life*	Very often/often	45%	29%	9%	0%	13%
	Sometimes; seldom	52%	64%	74%	25%	60%
	Never	4%	7%	17%	75%	26%
Get comfort and strength from religion	Yes	98%	97%	62%	5%	58%
	No	2%	3%	38%	95%	42%
Only one true religion	Only one true religion	34%	23%	5%	0%	10%
	Only one true religion but others contain some truth; No single true religion, all contain some basic truths	66%	75%	84%	46%	73%
	None of the religions offer any truth	0%	2%	11%	54%	17%
Thinks about meaning of life*	Often	40%	41%	19%	13%	23%
	Sometimes; seldom	59%	58%	75%	70%	70%
	Never	1%	2%	6%	17%	7%
Own way of connecting with the divine	Very much (5)	30%	23%	25%	20%	25%
	(2) – (4)	44%	52%	68%	35%	56%
	Not at all (1)	26%	25%	7%	45%	19%
Believes lucky charms protect	Definitely yes (10)	11%	10%	10%	5%	9%
	(2) – (9)	48%	48%	60%	38%	52%
	Definitely not (1)	42%	42%	30%	58%	39%

Notes:

* Questions are specific to Austria.


Numbers denote column percentages. Example: Among the group of the 'traditional religious', 69% experienced a 'very religious' upbringing and 30% experienced a 'rather religious' or 'not very religious' upbringing (=100%; difference is due to rounding).

Data source: EVS 2008.

As a final step, we selected respondents without any religious affiliation and studied what they believe and practice. We were especially interested in the size and development of the 'believing without belonging' group that has received much attention in the international literature. Our previous classification was derived from a traditional understanding of religiosity (specifi-

cally, it factored in attendance of religious services) that is too narrow to investigate the unaffiliated. Instead, we used the following two indicators: image of God and taking moments of prayer, meditation, and reflection (the more inclusive counterpart of frequency of praying).

Figure 8: Distribution of types among the unaffiliated in Austria, 1990–2008



Data source: EVS 1990, 1999, and 2008.

Those *believing without belonging* believe in a personal God or some sort of spirit or life force and take moments of prayer, meditation, or reflection. They may also be labelled ‘practicing believers’. The *secular* group does not believe in God, a spirit, or life force and takes no moments of prayer, meditation, or reflection. Those in between these types are the *passive believers* who either believe but do not practice or—less often—practice without believing.

Over a period of almost two decades there has been a clear increase in the secular group from 18% to 30% (Figure 8). This growth is to the detriment of the ‘believing without belonging’ group which is diminishing while the middle group has remained rather stable. Hence, the unaffiliated are not only a growing group but they are becoming more secular as well.

5. Summary

This paper set out to compare various religious indicators between Vienna and the other federal states of Austria and to examine trends over a period of (up to) 25 years. The main findings of this analysis may be summarised as follows.

First, the level of religion differs strongly between Vienna and the rest of Austria, but there is a conspicuous secularisation trend throughout. Previous studies revealed that religious decline is—with some exceptions—a general development across European countries, giving birth to the idea that all countries are on a path towards a very low level of religiosity (Voas 2009). In a similar way, Vienna may be considered a forerunner of a development that the rest of Austria will experience in the future. In fact, religious projections for Austria have estimated a medium scenario of 47% Roman Catholics and 24% unaffiliated people by 2051 (Goujon et al. 2007: 260–263). These numbers are strikingly close to the Viennese composition 50 years before that date: Roman Catholics constituted 49% and unaffiliated people 26% in 2001. A study of religion in Vienna could therefore anticipate Austria's future pathway.

Second, Austria is still considered a predominantly Roman Catholic country, but this centuries-long tradition is rapidly eroding. In Vienna, a mere 40% adhere to the Roman Catholic Church, many of whom are nominal members who attend church only on major holidays and at family celebrations. We have shown that the gap between affiliation and attendance has increased over successive cohorts and that the share of nominal members has risen. Irregular churchgoers are not embedded in a community in which religious beliefs are continually nurtured and sustained. Due to the shortage of clergy, many priests have to minister to more than one parish, thus weakening the Roman Catholic Church's capacity to retain old members (or attract new ones). In such a situation, there is further leeway for leaving the church. Moreover, nominal members cannot be expected to raise their children in a religious way, thus leading to a further decline across generations, as confirmed by our results. In general, erosion is strong *within* the Catholic Church. A future decline seems inevitable, also prompted by the unfavourable age structure, i.e. a higher share of Catholics among the older population (Goujon et al. 2007: 239). Nevertheless, several initial and fragile signs of consolidation have been observed in the diocese of Vienna, where the rates of leaving were higher in the 1990s than in the 2000s—contrary to the other Austrian dioceses. As painful as it may be, the Roman Catholic Church in Vienna has initiated a process of restructuring its parish structure (*Pfarre neu*). Whilst a regular occurrence in other Euro-

pean countries, only a few church buildings have as yet been repurposed for different uses in Austria (Wehdorn 2006). The most recent example of this process took place in 2013 when a church in Vienna was conferred to the Serbian Orthodox Church. In the future, the Roman Catholic Church in Vienna and Austria can most likely expect to undergo low level consolidation, resulting in small but faithful communities.

Third, some trends run counter to the general decline in religiosity. Our results suggest that private religiosity (as measured by the frequency of praying) is much more stable than institutionalised forms. Among the Viennese population, one third pray at least monthly compared to half of the population in the other parts of Austria. Furthermore, self-assessed religiosity continues to be high among some religious minorities.

Fourth, we found that more than half of the population across Austria is neither decidedly religious nor non-religious, but fuzzy. For the latter group, religion is of little importance in their daily lives although they tend to believe in a higher power and have their own way of connecting to the divine. They are open to exploring other religious traditions and are more susceptible to alternative beliefs. The fuzzy group has increased in Vienna and has remained constant in the other federal states. We also explored the subgroup of those who believe without belonging, i.e. about one third of the unaffiliated. They continue to believe in a higher power and take moments of prayer or meditation while remaining detached from religious institutions. Overall, their share is around 5% of the total Austrian population. This is only half the level of what has been estimated on average for ten European countries (Storm 2009: 709). In general, the unaffiliated have become more secular over time: an increasing proportion describes themselves as atheist, has never been affiliated or was raised by unaffiliated parents.

This paper provides a comprehensive account of different religious indicators over time and across regions, based on a large number of surveys and guided by different theoretical considerations. However, it has not attempted to show how religiosity differs qualitatively between urban and rural spaces, nor has it identified the unique characteristics of a 'city religion'. Smaller-scale studies allow researchers to delve deeper into the different urban religious communities (e.g., Orsi 1999; Pinxten and Dikomitis 2009). Such investigations could help us to better understand the quantitative developments we have observed in Vienna compared to smaller cities and rural regions in Austria.

Our aim was to depict *how* the religiosity of Vienna's population differs from that among the other federal states. Naturally, the question *why* it is so arises, and future research is needed to fully explore the differences we have identified. This would require a research design that addresses the role of

the population composition, social factors, and historical developments. Decomposition analysis is needed to investigate what share of the regional gap arises due to differences in the population structures. Compositional effects can proceed in different directions for different characteristics. While the higher prevalence of highly educated persons would lower religiosity levels in Vienna, our results would lead us to expect the higher proportion of migrants to have a positive effect. We have demonstrated that Muslims and Orthodox Christians—who are often migrants—show a higher average level of religiosity. Furthermore, the social factors we addressed in the theoretical part would have to be systematised, operationalised, and tested. In this way, the role of social ties or liberal and egalitarian attitudes—to name just two examples—in explaining the religiosity gap between Vienna and the other federal states could be clarified. Finally, a historical account could identify reasons that are rooted in the past. Notably, the proportion of unaffiliated people in 1950 was already three times higher in Vienna than in the rest of Austria. Such research could elucidate whether path dependencies (e.g., the capital's strong social democratic past) can help us to understand the low level of religiosity among the Viennese population.

Appendix

Table A.1: Overview of sample sizes (unweighted)

	Other federal states	Vienna	Total
ISSP 1986	1,622	392	2,014
ISSP 1988	722	250	972
ISSP 1989	1,573	424	1,997
ISSP 1993	1,599	412	2,011
ISSP 1994	746	231	977
ISSP 1995	813	194	1,007
ISSP 1999	809	193	1,002
ISSP 2000	822	194	1,016
ISSP 2001	859	152	1,011
ISSP 2002	1,642	405	2,047
ISSP 2004	823	183	1,006
ISSP 2008	758	262	1,020
ISSP 2010	809	210	1,019
EVS 1990	1,167	293	1,460
EVS 1999	1,213	309	1,522
EVS 2008	1,206	304	1,510

Table A.2: Wording of questions and coding of response categories

	Reference
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION	
ISSP: “Which religious denomination do you belong to?” - Roman Catholic (<i>Roman Catholic</i>) - Protestant (<i>Protestant church; Protestant free church</i>) - Other (<i>Orthodox; other Christian denomination; a Muslim denomination; other non-Christian denomination</i>) - Unaffiliated (<i>No denomination</i>)	Figure 1/ Figure 3/ Figure 4/ Table 2
Census: “Religious denomination” - Roman Catholic (<i>Roman Catholic</i>) - Protestant (<i>Protestant, Augsburg confession; Protestant, Helvetic confession</i>) - Other (<i>Old Catholic; Islam; Jewish; Other</i>) - Unaffiliated (<i>No denomination</i>)	Figure 1/ Figure 2
Quality of Life in Vienna survey: “Do you belong to a religious denomination, if so, which one?” - Roman Catholic (<i>Roman Catholic</i>) - Protestant (<i>Protestant</i>) - Orthodox (<i>Orthodox</i>) - Muslim (<i>Muslim</i>) - Unaffiliated (<i>No denomination</i>) - Total (+ <i>Other Christian; Jewish; other religion</i>)	Figure 6
PARENTS’ RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION	
ISSP: “Which religion did your mother/father belong to when you were a child?” - Affiliated (<i>Roman Catholic; Protestant church; Protestant free church; other Christian denomination; a Muslim denomination; other non-Christian denomination</i>) - Unaffiliated (<i>No denomination</i>) - <i>Mother/father did not live anymore/did not live together with me</i>	Table 2
ATTENDANCE OF RELIGIOUS SERVICES	
ISSP: “How often do you attend a religious service?” - At least monthly (<i>Several times a week; once a week; almost every week; 2-3 times a month; approximately once a month</i>) - Several times a year (<i>Several times a year</i>)	Figure 3/ Figure 4

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Less frequently/never (<i>Once or twice a year; less than once a year; never</i>) 	
<p>EVS: “Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend church services?”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - At least monthly (<i>More than once a week; once a week; about once a month</i>) - Several times a year (<i>Christmas or Easter day; only on other specific holidays</i>) - Less frequently/never (<i>Once a year; less often; never</i>) 	Figure 7
FREQUENCY OF PRAYING	
<p>ISSP: “About how often do you pray?”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - At least weekly (<i>Several times a day; once a day; several times a week; every week</i>) - Monthly (<i>Almost every week; 2-3 times a month; about once a month</i>) - Less frequently (<i>Several times a year; about 1-2 times a year; less than once a year</i>) - Never (<i>Never</i>) 	Figure 5
<p>EVS: “How often do you pray to God outside of religious services?”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - At least once a month (<i>Every day; more than once a week; once a week; at least once a month</i>) - Less frequently (<i>Several times a year; less often</i>) - Never (<i>Never</i>) <p>1990 wave (different response categories):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - At least once a month (<i>Often; sometimes</i>) - Less frequently (<i>Hardly ever; only in times of crisis</i>) - Never (<i>Never</i>) 	Figure 7
SELF-ASSESSED RELIGIOSITY	
<p>Quality of Life in Vienna survey: “Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are? 1 means not religious at all, 10 means very religious”</p>	Figure 6
IMPORTANCE OF GOD	
<p>EVS: “How important is God in your life? 10 means very important, 1 not important at all”</p>	Figure 7

RELIGIOUS BELIEFS	
EVS: “Which, if any, of the following do you believe in?” - Life after death: <i>yes/no</i> - Hell: <i>yes/no</i> - Heaven: <i>yes/no</i> - Sin: <i>yes/no</i>	Figure 7
IMPORTANCE OF SACRAMENTS	
EVS: “Do you personally think it is important to hold a religious service for any of the following events?” - Birth: <i>yes/no</i> - Marriage: <i>yes/no</i> - Death: <i>yes/no</i>	Figure 7
MOMENTS OF PRAYER/MEDITATION	
EVS: “Do you take some moments of prayer, meditation or contemplation or something like that?” <i>Yes/no</i>	Figure 8
IMAGE OF GOD	
EVS: “Which of these statements comes closest to your beliefs?” - <i>There is a personal God</i> - <i>There is some sort of spirit or life force</i> - <i>I don’t really know what to think</i> - <i>I don’t think there is any sort of spirit, God or life force</i>	Figure 8

Notes: Question wording is taken from the source questionnaires and adapted based on the Austrian questionnaires. Original answering categories are printed in italics. Whenever question wording or response categories changed slightly over time, we refer to the most recent wave. For question wording and response categories pertaining to Table 4, see http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/fmShowpage?v_page_id=4052961279360750

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